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enormous influence on the discipline. The first examines the
career of David Laitin, whose work incorporates ethnography
and rational choice—methods often deemed to be antitheti-
cal—and the second solicits comments on the recent land-
mark publication by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett,
Case Studies and Theory Development (MIT Press, 2005).
The following issue (Fall 2006) will begin the tenure of a
new editor, whom I am delighted to introduce. Gary Goertz has
written widely on international relations and on methodologi-
cal issues and teaches regularly at IQRM, the winter graduate
training institute at Arizona State University. Having engaged
with both quantitative and qualitative methodological issues,
he is well positioned to foster a productive debate among
scholars who utilize diverse approaches to the study of poli-
tics. I know that Gary is looking forward to engaging with the
QualMeth community and wishes to hear your ideas on how
to maintain the newsletter as a vital part of our research com-
munity. Please join me in welcoming Gary, and please accept
my thanks for your participation in the newsletter’s ongoing
activities. Finally, let me take this opportunity to thank Joshua
Yesnowitz, who has served as our assistant editor for the past
several years and will continue under Gary’s tenure. Josh has
done a superb job of keeping track of the details and putting
everything together. We are grateful for his stewardship.
nographic sensitivity to contextual realities can be squared
with the a priori simplifications necessitated by rational choice
approaches. But, importantly, each of the authors also believes
it is a combination well worth attempting.
Each of the papers in this symposium was originally pre-
sented as a Qualitative Methods Roundtable at the September
2005 American Political Science Association meetings in Wash-
ington. David Laitin’s responses to these papers concludes
this symposium, but begins a long, continuing conversation
with his many critical admirers.
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In two influential articles David Laitin laid out a tripartite
method for comparative politics and for social science more
generally (Laitin 2002, 2003). The three methods that Laitin
advocated were Formal Theory, Quantitative Analysis, and
Narrative. In this paper I take issue with Laitin’s categorization
scheme for the methods, and I consider the criteria and con-
straints on choosing methods.
One of the more encouraging developments in political
science over the last few years has been the appearance of
work that is self-consciously multi-methodological. An increas-
ing number of dissertations and publications combine formal
models with statistical analysis of large-n data sets and com-
parative case studies.
Less evident are efforts to combine ethnography, or the
recovery of the intersubjective world of actors themselves,
with more mainstream traditional or formal methods. David Laitin
is one of the rare scholars who has engaged in serious ethnog-
raphy (Hegemony and Culture), combined ethnography with
other methods (Identity in Formation), and applied rational
choice techniques, with James Fearon, to issues of identity.
(“Explaining Interethnic Cooperation”) His work provides the
opportunity for this symposium.
Each of the authors has critically engaged Laitin’s work,
with an eye toward assessing the merits and possibilities of
combining serious ethnographic scholarship with rational
choice. While conclusions are best left to readers themselves,
it is fair to say that the authors share concerns with how eth-
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2004, we ran two symposia, the first on techniques of field
research and the second on content and discourse analysis.
In Fall 2004, we tackled Charles Ragin’s complex and innova-
tive technique of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA),
and its recent variants.  In Spring of last year we ran symposia
on the qualitative/quantitative distinction (with contributions
from both sides of the divide), and on the use of necessary-
condition causal propositions. This past Fall we featured a
discussion of where new hypotheses originate, by Richard
Snyder, along with two symposia, one focused on Ian Shapiro’s
The Flight from Reality in the Human Sciences, and the sec-
ond devoted to the subject of concept formation in the social
sciences.
Every year we take notice of recent methodological pub-
lications that may be of interest to our readers. (For the rea-
sons mentioned above, we don’t cover work that is narrowly
tailored to statistical analysis.) The Book Notes and Article
Notes features are intended to list work that either has an
explicit methodological focus or uses an innovative technique
to good effect. If you know of a book or article published
since 2000 that has not already appeared in these pages—and
has a strong methodological theme or innovation—do let us
know.  (Self-nominations are encouraged!)
In this issue, we are fortunate to be able to feature two
roundtables focused on the work of scholars who have had
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Types of Methods
Laitin’s tripartite framework is an intriguing methodologi-
cal model for the social sciences. While I agree with many
aspects of the argument, in contrast to Laitin’s tripartite frame-
work I believe there are actually two major distinctions sepa-
rating the vast array of methodologies available to social sci-
entists: theory vs. data, and formalization vs. non-formaliza-
tion. Moreover I think that these distinctions might usefully
form the basis of a two-by-two categorization scheme yielding
four types of methods: Theory, Formal Theory, Narrative, and
Quantitative Analysis (see Table 1).
Table 1
            Analysis of Ideas      Analysis of Data
  Non-formal    Theory (T)      Narrative (N)
  Formal            Formal Theory (FT)       Quantitative
                     Analysis (QA)
The primary difference in my formulation from Laitin’s
framework is the distinction between methodologies that fo-
cus on the analysis of data and those that focus on the analy-
sis of ideas or theories, and the division of theory into formal
and non-formal types.
The four methodological labels—Theory, Formal Theory,
Narrative and Quantitative Analysis—stand in of course for a
wide array of actual methods.  Non-formal theory encompasses
any abstract thought, philosophy, or set of rules, principles,
beliefs, or ideas which has not been formalized into math-
ematical language. That which has been formalized into math-
ematical concepts, including social choice, game-theory, dif-
ferential equation modeling, etc., can be called formal theory.
Formal theory and theory are fundamentally about the analy-
sis of ideas rather than data.
In contrast, narrative and quantitative analysis share an
analytic focus on data, rather than ideas. These data can be
derived from a variety of sources (interviews, texts, surveys,
etc.), but what separates narrative from quantitative analysis
is the formalization of data into quantified or numerical enti-
ties subject to statistical methods. Narrative can mean eth-
nography, discourse analysis, case studies, or any analysis
of data that has not been formalized through quantification.
Similarly, quantitative analysis is the examination of quanti-
fied data using a variety of statistical methods from simple
significance tests in cross-tabulations to a wide range of re-
gression models including OLS, probit, and Bayesians statis-
tics.
Laitin did emphasize the distinction between formal theory
and quantitative analysis, but I think his tripartite framework
did not go far enough in differentiating the two. We must
push understanding of the differences further. In practice there
appears to be an affinity between quantitative analysis and
formal theory, but it’s crucial to properly understand what the
two methods share, as well as what distinguishes them. For-
mal theory and quantitative analysis primarily share one thing:
mathematical language. That is, they are both formal in the
sense of relying on mathematics to work out complicated rela-
tionships among variables, and they accept the constraints
imposed by that language. This shared language accounts
for why it might sometimes seem that quantitative analysis
scholars and formal modelers are better able to talk to each
other than those who don’t share their language, i.e. those
working in non-formal theory or methods.  But, a shared lan-
guage, or shared formalization, does not bridge the ocean of
difference between the two methods in terms of the object of
analysis, namely theory vs. data. Quantitative analysis is fun-
damentally about data. It uses the science of statistics to
manipulate empirical evidence. Often the goal is to empirically
test existing theories, either formal or non-formal. But without
data, there is no quantitative analysis.
Quantitative types hunger for large data sets, and with-
out data sets, the operation comes to a halt. Indeed, there are
those so committed to QA that if the datasets do not exist for
a given problem, they do not study it; and there are some who
will resort to using any data, no matter how poor, as long as
they exist. The key point is that QA shares with narrative—or
history, or ethnography, or discourse analysis—an analytic
focus and dependence on empirical data.
These data-focused methodologies are very different from
formal modeling or theory. Formal theory is fundamentally a
theoretical exercise. The common substitution of theory for
modeling in the title is not a coincidence. Formal theorists do
not set out first and foremost to solve empirical puzzles; rather,
they make their living formalizing ideas that have not yet been
formalized. In confronting a topic, the formal theorist asks,
has this been modeled? Or, in other words, has the logic or set
of ideas been put into mathematical language? To put it more
starkly, formal theory can operate without datasets, and in a
world without datasets, the formal theory enterprise would
hardly suffer. Ideas, not data, are the foundation of theory,
both formal and non-formal. Thus, formal theory shares much
with non-formal theory, and it is the analysis of ideas that
links these two methods and separates them from both quan-
titative analysis and narrative.
How Many and Which Methods to Use?
What has turned out to be most provocative about Laitin’s
tripartite method was not the list of methods themselves or
the categorization scheme which included the three methods,
but the idea which many people have taken from the discus-
sion of the tripartite method, namely that all social scientists
should use all three methods together in all of their research
projects.
At the 2005 APSA panel, Laitin argued that this was a
misinterpretation of the tripartite method, and that his view
was that the three methods should be used collectively by
social scientists in a way such that for any given research
problem all three methods get employed, and practitioners of
each method appreciate in their own work the contributions
of the other methods. Indeed, in the 2002 chapter, Laitin writes,
“my argument is not that all comparativists should have highly
cultivated statistical, formal, and narrative skills” (Laitin 2002,
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659) and he goes on to argue that no one method should
dominate the discipline. However, if one reads the 2002 article
carefully, we see that Laitin does not actually say how many
methods one person should use; he suggests three is too
many for one person and he argues for collective diversity,
but he then leaves it at that.
Rather than clarifying, in the 2003 article, Laitin starts out
remarkably vague on the issue of just how many methods
one researcher ought to use.1 In critiquing two scholars, Bent
Flyvbjerg and Stanley Tambiah, whose primary contributions
are to the use of narrative methods, he writes, “the work would
have much greater scientific value if placed within what I
have dubbed the tripartite method of comparative research–
a method that integrates narrative..., statistics, and formal mod-
eling” (Laitin 2003, 164-5, emphasis in original). But what does
it mean to say the narrative work should be “placed within”
the tripartite method? Does it mean that Flyvbjerg and Tambiah
should have added quantitative and formal modeling to their
analyses? Or does it mean some other scholars should have
come along and studied the same problems as Flyvbjerg and
Tambiah using other methods? There is an enormous differ-
ence between saying social science research problems should
be studied from a number of methodological angles by differ-
ent people and saying individual researchers should use all
of the methods.
Farther on in the article, Laitin suggests that he means
the latter, namely that individuals should use all three meth-
ods. Laitin calls Randall Stone’s work, which uses all three
methods, “an exemplary model of the tripartite method” (Laitin
2003, 177). It is interesting that Laitin did not choose a collec-
tive enterprise of several scholars working on the same prob-
lem using different methods as the “exemplary model” of the
tripartite method, but rather he chose an individual who had
used all three methods. This choice suggests that the view
that Laitin is advocating the use of all three methods by indi-
viduals is not outside the range of reasonable interpretation.
Whether or not Laitin was actually arguing for the use of
multi-methods by individuals or merely advocating collective
diversity (or some of each), his writings in any case still high-
light the question of how many methods individual research-
ers should be expected to use in one project. I argue that the
four methods in the framework proposed above, or even the
three methods proposed by Laitin, are not necessary or desir-
able in every social science project. In my view, the appropri-
ateness or choice of methods depends on four factors:
(1) the nature of the problem under investigation, and
the contributions that a particular method might make
to such a study;
(2) the resources available to a scholar;
(3) the disciplinary context, including norms, incentives
and constraints, in which a scholar works; and
(4) the aptitude and will of a scholar to do multi-method
work.
No one method is a panacea for all social science prob-
lems. In particular, it is a mistake to assume that formal theory
is the only type of theory useful to social science. Many for-
mal theorists would agree that formalization of a theoretical
argument is not always required or advantageous. Sometimes
a problem is so simple as to make formalization redundant.
Sometimes it’s been done before, and therefore another for-
malization would yield no new insights. And most importantly,
there are classes of problems for which formalization is not
appropriate (yet, or perhaps ever): these include issues such
as irrational beliefs and behavior, non-transitive preferences,
and interactions in which new unknown and unknowable pos-
sibilities for action exist. Formal theory is not able to solve
these sorts of problems at the moment, and may never be able
to. While formal theorists are currently working on expanding
the range of formal models, it is very unlikely that in the near
future all theoretical issues will be subject to formal analysis.
Thus, sometimes a case can be made for formalization of theory,
and sometimes not.
In addition to the specificity of the problem at hand, re-
sources are another factor for scholars in choosing the appro-
priate set of methods. Methods are costly to learn and to do in
practice, and therefore the more methods one chooses, the
more costly it is for each researcher. Sometimes there are pub-
lic goods such as data sets or publicly available empirical
material, or existing theories or formal models which can be
built upon, that lower the cost for researchers using a particu-
lar method, but this is not always the case, and thus, often,
choosing methods requires trade-offs, which in practical terms
might mean leaving out a method, despite it’s potential ben-
efit. Hence the following types of contributions by individual
scholars: theoretical work or formal models which have no
empirical component, or work which uses only narrative or
quantitative analysis rather than both. That these are the con-
tributions of individuals does not mean that others cannot
add to the collective contribution by bringing additional meth-
ods to the study of the same problem, but resource constraints
do and probably will continue to limit the number of methods
that any individual can employ.
Discipline or sub-disciplinary norms also play a role in
which methods researchers choose, and there is variation
across fields. For example, if we survey the social sciences as
a whole, it is economics and political science, rather than an-
thropology, for example, where formal theory has been most
successful. And in political science, it is the subfields of IR
and American politics where formal modeling has advanced
furthest. The reasons for this differential success are related
to issues of problem-appropriateness and resources discussed
above, but also, I believe, to the expectations and receptivity
of different subfields to theoretical versus empirical work.
Fields where theory is privileged and case-specific data re-
quirements are the least rigorous are most receptive to theo-
retical enterprises such as formal modeling. In political sci-
ence, comparative politics arguably has higher case-specific
data requirements than IR. Comparativists, like anthropolo-
gists for example, are expected to know a lot about a given
place, and to have experience in collecting data in that place.
The comparativist who does not speak the language of his or
her region of expertise is unlikely to get a job. Not so in IR.
The IR area-specialist who works with regional documents in
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original languages is a rare species. Most IR scholars are
generalists, working on a topic in many places, without deep,
language-dependent knowledge of particular places. This is
no criticism, it’s just an observation, which I think suggests
that IR as a field is less demanding of detailed case-specific
data than comparative politics. This may partially explain why
formal theory has made more contributions in IR than com-
parative politics. It is not to say that formal theory is incom-
patible with case-specific data or fields that rely on primary
language or case-specific data, but just that as a costly method
which occasionally leaves out empirical work, it is not so sur-
prising to find it has had a more positive reception in IR than
in comparative politics.
Resource constraints or availability of data and theory
also interact with disciplinary norms. In fields where empirical
data or datasets are readily available, and therefore the cost of
providing empirical tests are lower, there tends to be a higher
threshold for expectations of empirical work. For example, in
American politics, the sheer number of people working in the
subfield and the accumulated body of both theory and empiri-
cal evidence in narrative as well as quantitative form mean
that it is much less costly for a scholar to include multiple
methods in a project than it would be for someone studying a
place with much less existing work, theoretical and empirical,
such as Sri Lanka. Thus, is it not so surprising that on average
Americanists probably employ, individually, the greatest num-
ber of methods on any given project.
Finally, disciplinary norms also effect the type of the prob-
lems most likely to be studied in particular subfields, and there-
fore also have an effect on the appropriateness of particular
methods. Fields that focus on individual actors or unitary
actors are most receptive to methodological individualism and
game-theoretic models of strategic interaction common in for-
mal modeling.  While these types of problems are common in
many subfields of political science, they may be most com-
mon in IR, where, not-coincidentally, formal modeling has be-
come so widely established.
To use all four methods–theory, formal theory, narrative,
and quantitative analysis–is a nice proposition to consider as
an ideal type, but as the examples above demonstrate, in prac-
tice it is rarely feasible owing to the nature of the problems
under investigation, resources, and disciplinary contexts. Simi-
larly, even in the case of Laitin’s tripartite method, the use of
all three methods is very uncommon in practice. A telling illus-
tration of this point is that in his discussion in support of his
tripartite method, Laitin could not find three good examples in
the political science literature (though perhaps he restricted
the pool to IR and comparative politics). Recall that he cited
Robert Bates’ coffee study, which used formal theory and
narrative (Bates 1998); then Adam Przeworski et al.’s work on
democracy, which used quantitative analysis and narrative
(Przeworski et al. 2000); and finally Randall Stone’s work, which
did use all three methods (Stone 2002), but which Laitin criti-
cized for the inadequate contribution of the narrative compo-
nent, claiming it was overshadowed by the quantitative analy-
sis and the formal model. Ironically, had Laitin cited his own
work, he would have had examples of the tripartite method,
but to do so would have highlighted how rare such choices
are outside of American politics. This point brings up the final
factor in choosing methods, which is the will of individual
researchers.
David Laitin’s methodological breadth is not common.
Over the course of his career he has not just learned new
methods, but also new languages and new places to test his
theories. This constant retooling is both costly and rare. After
a certain point–often middle age–most scholars are not inter-
ested in moving out of their established comfort zone. Area
specialists stick with their area; and quantitative people stick
with quantitative analysis, for example. Sometimes people in-
novate on the margins: scholars working on narrative case
studies expand their data analysis techniques and move into
quantitative analysis, or quantitative scholars add case stud-
ies or archival material, or formal modelers expand their math-
ematical knowledge to move into quantitative analysis.
But David Laitin has gone far beyond these types of mar-
ginal innovations. He began his lifelong work on ethnic and
language politics using narrative methods on African cases.
He followed ethnic politics to Europe and Catalonia, learning
new languages and places. But the end of the USSR seemed
to provide a major experimental testing ground for language
and identity politics so he again learned new languages, Rus-
sian and Estonian, and also new quantitative methods (con-
tent analysis and experiments), and began his study of formal
theory. His collaborations with James Fearon and the Minori-
ties at Risk dataset allowed him to do worldwide analysis of
ethnic conflict, fully using formal theory, narrative, and quan-
titative analysis. This commitment to really learning new places
(including languages) and new methods is extraordinary–and
exceptional. The decision to take the time and effort to learn
several languages and more than two methods is not some-
thing most scholars seem to want to do.  Whether we agree or
disagree with the merits of multi-method work, we have to
acknowledge that beyond non-formal theory, one or two meth-
ods at most appears to be the norm in comparative politics
and IR. As I have argued, resources, disciplinary norms, and
the nature of the problems facing researchers all impact the
methodological choices researchers make, but as the case of
David Laitin shows, the will of the researcher may also be a
factor. Even amongst social scientists, there’s no accounting
for taste.
Conclusions
Methodological choices cannot be dictated from with-
out. Researchers must be free and encouraged to make choices
appropriate to the problems at hand given the resources they
can acquire. The above discussion suggests that while we
should not expect to see all four methods being used by indi-
viduals in large numbers of scholarly works anytime soon, the
barriers to collective diversity are not particularly high either
and therefore we may well see all four methods more evenly
represented in research problems, depending of course on
the problems themselves, resources, disciplinary norms, and
the preferences of individual scholars.
In addition Table 1, and the two distinctions of theory vs.
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data, and formalization vs. non-formalization may suggest a
way to bridge the idealism of the individual-based tripartite
method with that of the more common one-or two-method
scholarship. If researchers were to choose a method from each
column and from each row, it would force most people out of
their comfort zone. To fulfill this requirement, researchers would
have to include one formal component (either formal theory or
quantitative analysis) and one non-formal component (either
theory or narrative); similarly they would have to include one
data component (either narrative or quantitative analysis) and
one theoretical component (either formal or non-formal
theory). This type of selection rule in choosing methodolo-
gies would introduce much greater flexibility than Latin’s tri-
partite suggestion, by allowing for fewer methods in any one
project and including non-formal theory as a choice. But, it
would follow the spirit of Laitin’s framework and his own work,
by encouraging all researchers to bridge the mathematical
and empirical divides. I hasten to add, however, that even this
two-by-two framework and methodological selection scheme
has to be seen as an ideal type predicated on the assumption
of adequate resources, including data, theory, and skills of re-
searchers. The most difficult and important problems that
political science faces–e.g. democracy, development, and rep-
resentation in inhospitable circumstances–may be areas where
several types of resources are lacking, and therefore at the
end of the day researchers have to make methodological
choices given the demands and constraints of problems of
interest.
Notes
1 To be fair, his primary goal in the 2003 article is set up the
tripartite method as a framework for social science and to place
narrative within framework on equal footing with quantitative and
formal modeling, and in the article Laitin spends a great deal of time
discussing the value of narrative methods.  So, it is possible that the
vagueness is the unintentional result of a focus on other issues.
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In his book Hegemony and Culture, David Laitin described
himself as being committed to “a comparative politics that is
sensitive to the particularities of each society, yet asks broad
and general questions about all societies” (1986: xii). This idea
of comparative politics–that it is in part a discipline that en-
gages in the study of individual countries mainly for the pur-
pose of producing cross-country generalizations–is the way
in which most of us define the field now. And Laitin’s work,
which includes a study of the particularities of Somalia, Nige-
ria, India, Spain, Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan in
order to produce knowledge about other countries and conti-
nents, is unprecedented in comparative politics in its ambition
and accomplishments in combining depth and breadth.
But what kind of breadth should we expect depth to gen-
erate? What kinds of generalizations based on within-country
studies should we value in comparative politics?
In principle, we value generalizations about outcomes. So,
when Lijphart finds that consociationalism preserves demo-
cratic stability in the Netherlands (Lijphart 1975, 1977), we want
to know if consociationalism is also associated with demo-
cratic stability in other countries–South Africa or the former
Yugoslavia. When Putnam finds that social capital explains
institutional performance in Italy (Putnam 1993), we want to
know if it also explains the same outcome elsewhere–Russia,
or the U.S.. And when Laitin finds that the hegemony intro-
duced by colonial rule explains the non-politicization of reli-
gion in Yorubaland (Laitin 1986), we want to know whether
colonial hegemony explain the non-politicization of cleavages
in other places–Zambia or India. Indeed, the ability to generate
correct predictions about outcomes in out-of-sample coun-
tries is often treated as a test for the validity of a theory devel-
oped from a within-country study.
Against this backdrop, I make four arguments in this es-
say, illustrated with reference to Laitin’s work:
(1) Although I share the view that the value of within-
country studies in comparative politics lies in generating knowl-
edge about other countries, I think that we are wrong in trying
to distill generalizations about outcomes from within–country
studies. The generalizations we should look for are generaliza-
tions about the mechanisms linking the independent and the
dependent variable.
(2) We should evaluate the quality of such generaliza-
tions, not by testing to see if the entire chain of mechanisms
linking the cause and the outcome in one country is the same
in others, but by seeing how far the chain of mechanisms in a
new country coincides with that of the first before it diverges.
(3) Arguing about whether we should use ethnography or
rational choice or both in our work is beside the point. “Eth-
nography” and “rational choice” are not strictly comparable–
the one is an approach to how data are collected, the other an
